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Constitutional Advice and Transnational
Legal Order
Tom Ginsburg*
This article surveys the history and practice of providing constitutional
advice. It first examines antecedents, then looks at the contemporary political
economy of the process, drawing on the transnational legal order (TLO)
framework to evaluate whether or not it can be characterized as a TLO.
The answer is a partial yes. We focus on one feature of the modern situation,
the presence of corporate actors—including the United Nations, NGOs,
and international organizations—in an increasingly dense social field. This
development has laid bare tensions and competition among actors, moving
the field toward a nascent TLO that is nevertheless unlikely to fully
consolidate or institutionalize. We conclude that the field evidences aspects
of a transnational legal order but also serves as an arena in which other
TLOs contest over outcomes.
The Setting ..................................................................................................................7
A brief history of transnational constitutional advice ..........................................9
1. Antecedents ...........................................................................................9
2. Goodnow and China ........................................................................ 10
3. Biting the Hand that Feeds? Ivor Jennings and the End of
Empire................................................................................................. 12
4. The New Americans ......................................................................... 13
5. Localism and Universalism .............................................................. 15
6. The People are the Client: Yash Ghai............................................ 17
7. The Lefties .......................................................................................... 20
8. Agents and Structure ........................................................................ 21
Toward Transnational Institutionalization.......................................................... 21
Speaking from Above for those Below: the United Nations and
Constitutions ............................................................................................... 23
* Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School and Research Professor,
American Bar Foundation. Thanks to Terence Halliday, Gregory Shaffer, and participants at the
Conference on Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Order, University of California, Irvine
School of Law in September 2016. Special thanks to Terence Halliday, Christina Murray, and Gregory
Shaffer for thoughtful comments.

5

6

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law

[Vol. 2:5

Normative Assessment: A Qualified Defense of Advice ................................. 25
Competition for Constitutions.............................................................................. 28
Is Constitution-Making a Transnational Legal Order? ..................................... 31
From Bangkok to Barcelona, from Juba to Johannesburg, and from Sana’a to
Santiago, the process of making national constitutions has garnered a good deal of
attention from the academic and policy communities in recent years.1 The ubiquity
of constitution-making processes—and the belief that constitutions can help
advance myriad goals, from economic revitalization to post-conflict
reconstruction—has generated demand for new forms of expertise as well as efforts
to supply it. In this article, we consider the field of constitution-making as a
transnational legal order (TLO).2 We argue that the TLO framework is fruitful in
that it illuminates aspects of the process, but also that this prominent field of legal
activity brings into relief aspects of the framework that may need further
elaboration. In that sense, the exercise is a recursive one, in which I juxtapose TLO
theory and the constitution-making field to say something about each.3
Constitution-making is a description for an activity occurs in a vastly diverse
set of contexts, attacking an array of very different problems. Some constitutions
are made in situations after violent conflict; others are designed to prevent conflict
from ever emerging; yet others involve minor revisions to political bargains in
otherwise stable orders. One could easily and fairly refine these subcategories to
discuss different kind of problem-driven approaches. It is also the case that
constitution-making exercises are highly contested. Notwithstanding the persistent
dualist imagery in which “higher” interests align,4 constitutional politics are intense,
high stakes, and occasionally violent.5
This article begins with a brief history of constitution-making to describe the
setting, then turns to the specific topic of transnational constitutional-advice giving.
It then turns to a mapping of the contemporary terrain, with an informal accounting
of the assets and capacities various repeat actors bring to the endeavor.
Constitution-building has become a nascent form of expertise, with its own
programs and experts. When one visits myriad constitution-making sites, one runs

1.
TODD A. EISENSTADT, ET AL, CONSTITUENTS BEFORE ASSEMBLY: PARTICIPATION,
DELIBERATION, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE WORLDWIDE CRAFTING OF NEW CONSTITUTIONS,
(forthcoming 2017); GABRIEL NEGRETTO, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN LATIN AMERICA (2013); Kevin L. Cope, The Intermestic Constitution: Lessons
From the World’s Newest Nation, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 667 (2013); Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, & Justin
Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter? 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201 (2009).
2. See generally, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
3. This is a bit of a pun. See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE C. CARUTHERS, BANKRUPT:
GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) (developing recursivity idea at length).
4. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1992); see also NEGRETTO, supra note 1 (focusing on
mixed game of conflict and cooperation).
5. David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923 (2013).
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into a relatively limited set of repeat actors. Clearly, the field, and the world, have
become more institutionalized since the end of the Cold War.
Does this make constitution-making a TLO? Halliday and Shaffer define a
TLO as a set of “formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors
that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national
jurisdictions.”6 While there is no central institution that authoritatively structures
the practice of constitution-making, there is a loose network of institutions and
actors that work in the field in multiple contexts, and the United Nations (UN)
often seeks (sometimes unsuccessfully) to assert its dominance.7 Some institutions
attempt to promote substantive norms, while others focus on the process of
constitution-making. However, all of this is relatively under-institutionalized at the
moment, and there is not, nor will there be, a transnational legal instrument or
binding legal text on constitution-making.8
Indeed, it might be best to think about constitution-making as a field in which
other TLOs come to engage in contests over outcomes. A contemporary
constitution-making situation in a developing country might involve: various
internal groups seeking a stake in power; several different units within the UN
pushing for various sets of norms that might even be inconsistent with each other;
the human rights community; a “transitional justice” legal order; a group pushing
for federalism; a gender audit group; international financial institutions; bilateral
donors arguing over religion clauses and oil rights; and various others. These
different legal groups will have different agendas and not be aligned with each other.
The result is a bounded set of contests that takes place in a temporally and
geographically defined field. The article concludes with speculation on the
implications of this analysis for the TLO framework.
THE SETTING
National constitutions have become one of the key components of a modern
nation-state. Despite our imagery of a constitution as the quintessential expression
of the values of a particular political community, constitutions are—and always have
been—embedded in a transnational context. Written constitutions in the modern
sense are a particular form that emerged in the 18th century, borrowing upon earlier
ideas and institutions.9 The form, which crystallized with the adoption of
revolutionary constitutions in the United States, Poland, and France at the end of
the 18th century, spread transnationally, partly because of the influence of
6. HALLIDAY & SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 5.
7. See, e.g., Afyare Abdi Elmi, Revisiting the UN-Controlled Constitution-Making Process for Somalia,
E-International Relations, Sept. 2, 2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/02/revisiting-the-uncontrolled-constitution-making-process-for-somalia/ [last accessed Jan. 11, 2017].
8. The United Nations Secretary General’s note described below in note 132 is the closest thing
there is. But this is in essence an internal administrative order, articulated as a vague set of principles,
to the vast bureaucracy of the UN, not purporting to bind outsiders.
9. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, 41-42 (2009).
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revolutionary and liberal thought in Latin America.10 New nation states began to
adopt constitutions as one of their first acts in existence.11 The documents play both
symbolic and functional roles, defining a government and regulating the relationship
between a government and its citizens. They also serve, in theory, to bind together
the people. And importantly, they also serve as a signal to the international
community that the government is a legitimate one.
Constitutional drafting is often undertaken in less than ideal conditions.
Constitutions are often produced in situations of political uncertainty and under
great time pressures, and the task is exacerbated by the fact that few constitutional
drafters have any experience in the field. Repeat players are rare, even in countries
in which constitutions do not last very long.12 This means that drafters often look
for shortcuts.
This leads to two dynamics. First, constitutions tend to adopt a common set
of core institutions.13 Look at the tables of contents of national constitutions and
one will see a good deal of similarity. Virtually all constitutions have a separate
section on a bill of rights, as well as sections on government, the judiciary, the
legislature, local government, and, increasingly, accountability institutions.14 There
are core institutions, found in almost every constitution, and also peripheral
institutions which are found in relatively few. For example, 98% of constitutions
stipulate how the head of state is to be selected, while something like 2% provide
for a right to bear arms.15 The former is a core provision, the latter a peripheral one.
One might think of these core elements as the settled component of the
transnational legal order of constitution-making.
The second dynamic is in part related to the first. Because constitutions are in
part directed outside the nation-state, drafters often pay attention to the perceived
demands of the international community. This leads drafters to adopt norms
embodied in other constitutions written around the same time. Indeed, along with
my co-authors in the Comparative Constitutions Project, I have shown that the best
predictors of constitutional form are the era and region in which the constitution
was drafted, as well as the contents of previous constitutions in the country’s
history.16 But the transnational nature of the process also means that countries
frequently turn to outsiders to provide substantive advice.

10.
ROBERTO GARGARELLA, THE CONSTITUTION OF INEQUALITY. CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN THE AMERICAS 1776-1860 (2010).
11. ELKINS, ET AL. supra note 9, at 41-42 (2009) (showing fast adoption by post-1789 states).
12. ELKINS, ET AL. supra note 9, at 123; See also Donald Horowitz, “Constitutional Design and the
Problem of adoption: Proposals versus Processes”, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY 21 (Andrew
Reynolds ed., 2002).
13. See Horowitz, supra note 12.
14.
See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Writing Rights (Mar. 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ADVICE
This section provides a thumbnail history of transnational advice-giving
through the experiences of several prominent practitioners. The idea here is not by
any means to be comprehensive, but to be suggestive of some of the enduring
themes and debates. As can be seen, the practice of constitutional advice engages a
kind of dialectic between universal forms, of which written constitutions are
themselves an embodiment, and local context. The major point of this section is
that before 1990, most of the efforts involved one-off engagements with particular
individuals and institutions, rather than a discrete social field. But since then the
field is becoming more densely populated and institutionalized.
1.

Antecedents

Constitutional advice has a long and distinguished history in the modern
period. No less a figure than Jean-Jacques Rousseau was called on to advise
constitution-making processes in Corsica and Poland in the late 18th century. Each
of these proto-countries was struggling for independence, and thought that a
constitution would help to cement its claim to nationhood.17 Who could be better
than the leading political theorist of the day to help in the process? By inclination,
Rousseau was prone to abstraction, and he did not focus much on concrete
institutions. Indeed, he was unable to finish his “Plan for a Constitution for Corsica”
before the French Government took over the island.18 Rousseau had a bit more
influence in Poland, where his essay on Considerations on the Government of Poland
apparently had some impact on the nobles who negotiated the short-lived
Constitution of 1791.19 His advice was modest, noting that “institutions for Poland
can only be the work of Poles,” such that a “foreigner can hardly do more than
offer some general observations for the enlightenment, but not for the guidance, of
the law-reformer.”20 Rousseau emphasized the importance of cultural activities like
sports in building a common identity as a nation.21 It was hardly his fault that Poland
was eliminated as an independent state within a few years: no constitutional
arrangement could change the country’s unfortunate location between the
expanding empires of Prussia and Russia.

17.
MADS QVORTRUP, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF REASON at 75 (Manchester Univ. Press, 2003).
18. LEO DAMROSCH: JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: RESTLESS GENIUS 386-88 (2005).
19. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Proposed Reformation
(1772), http://www.constitution.org/jjr/poland.htm.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Goodnow and China

As more and more countries became independent in the 19th century, demand
for advice grew, and Western experts were well situated to provide it.22 One early
story of constitutional advice illustrates the potential pitfalls. Frank Goodnow,
Columbia professor and the first president of the American Political Science
Association, was asked by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in
October 1912 to advise the Chinese Government on constitutional reform.23 On
paper, Goodnow seemed to embody just the kind of interdisciplinary approach that
should have been ideal. His area of expertise was administrative law, the area of law
that deals with government organization and communication with citizens, and he
took an explicitly political approach.24 He had studied in France and Germany as
well as the United States.25 A believer in the power of technocratic expertise, he was
known as a powerful figure in progressive thought.26
As a comparative scholar, Goodnow knew better than to simply promote
American style institutions for China. Indeed, his scholarly work had posited that
the United States had much to learn from constitutional and administrative models
in other countries, especially Britain. Systems of government, he concluded, “are
matters which must very largely be governed by the history and political needs of
the particular country, and any attempt to impose on a country any hard and fast
rule derived either from a priori reasoning or from any inductive generalization,
based upon the experience of other countries, is rather more apt to meet with failure
than success.”27
As a believer in technocracy, Goodnow did not pay much attention to local
politics, and by his own account was not deeply informed about China. He quickly
became a proponent of executive power in the Chinese context, believing that the
complexity of the country required strong central authority, and was amenable to a
parliamentary system.28 This view fit the interests of the warlord Yuan Shikai, who
had taken over as president in 1914 after a struggle with Sun Yat-Sen’s new
Kuomintang Party. Yuan adopted a new constitution that was heavily influenced by

22. For example, Harvard Law Professor Simon Greenleaf drafted the Constitution of Liberia
in 1847. See GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE
WORLD 1787-1989 at 483 (2009). (Interestingly, it is one of the few constitutions outside the United
States which included a right to bear arms!)
23.
JEDIDIAH KRONCKE, THE FUTILITY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: CHINA AND THE
DANGERS OF EXPORTING AMERICAN LAW 135-40 (2016).
24. Id. at 133-36.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 133-35.
27. Noel Pugach, Embarrassed Monarchist: Frank J. Goodnow and Constitutional Development in China,
1913-1915. 42 PAC. HIST. REV. 499, 501 (1973). See also JEDIDIAH KRONCKE, THE FUTILITY OF LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT: CHINA AND THE DANGERS OF EXPORTING AMERICAN LAW, 132-57 (2016).
28. Noel Pugach, Embarrassed Monarchist: Frank J. Goodnow and Constitutional Development in China,
1913-1915. 42 PAC. HIST. REV. 499, 503 (1973).
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Goodnow’s draft.29 It included several western style concepts like equality and
privacy, but also featured strongly centralized power.
Still, Goodnow was frustrated. In one letter he noted, somewhat patronizingly,
“as I look at it these Chinese have hardly the faintest idea of what a constitution is.
They do not, I think, even know what law is.”30 He grew increasingly frustrated by
the unwillingness of Chinese to engage his advice: “My feeling was and is that the
Chinese, the experience of all the advisers here would seem to show, have really no
serious intention of following the advice of their advisers, unless that advice agrees
with their own conclusions. Indeed, they regard their advisers as almost entirely
ornamental in character and seldom let us know what is really going on. All we do
is to write essays which are translated into Chinese and then what happens to them
Heaven only knows.”31
But this was not to be the case with his final essay. In 1915, after having
returned to the US to become president of Johns Hopkins University, Goodnow
drafted a short memo for Yuan entitled “Monarchy or Republic?”, answering the
rhetorical question in favor of the former.32 Monarchy, after all, was consistent with
Chinese tradition and resolved problems of executive succession. Noting that the
Chinese context was more similar to that of the troubled republics of Latin America
than to the United States or England, Goodnow noted that “[i]t is not susceptible
of doubt, that a monarchy is better suited than a republic to China.”33
Goodnow’s views meshed perfectly with those of Yuan, who had been toying
with establishing himself as a new emperor. His faction used Goodnow’s
endorsement to push forward a new draft of a monarchical constitution. Yuan’s
proposal could not have been further from the views of prominent Chinese
intellectuals like Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, who had been writing about the
optimal form of Chinese government for decades. As a prominent Chinese
intellectual said in the pages of the New York Times, “Dr. Goodnow was used
simply as a tool. He is a great scholar, a professor, a citizen of a great republic, but
he was duped by the monarchist faction, because he did not have a real insight into
the situation.”34 Goodnow’s friend Paul Reinsch wrote that “Advisors had been so
generally treated as academic ornaments . . . that Doctor Goodnow did not suspect
that in this case his memorandum would be made the starting point and basis of
positive action.”35 Yuan Shi’kai ultimately decided to try to ascend the throne as a
new emperor. However, he died before he could be enthroned, and China’s long
period of chaos, civil war, and failed governments continued for several more
decades. Goodnow’s constitutional project failed, and his return home was marked
29. Id. at 504.
30. Jedidiah Kroncke, An Early Tragedy Of Comparative Constitutionalism: Frank Goodnow And The
Chinese Republic, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 533, 560 (2011).
31. Id. at 563.
32. Id. at 570-71.
33. Kroncke, supra note 30, at 571.
34. Id. at 574.
35. Id. at 500.
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by criticism over his endorsement of monarchy. Goodnow’s story illustrates the
pitfalls and politics of advice-giving. While he sought to tailor his advice to local
conditions, he was unaware of the uses to which it would be put. Expertise, we are
reminded, is always political, but the experts may sometimes not be able to deploy
it effectively or intentionally.36 Additionally, clients seeking expertise have their own
interests and tools that they bring to the game.
3.

Biting the Hand that Feeds? Ivor Jennings and the End of Empire

Sir Ivor Jennings was a British academic and already a star constitutional
lawyer when he was asked to take an appointment as Principal of Ceylon College. 37
He then moved to Sri Lanka and presided over the creation of the University of
Peradeniya.38 Upon arriving in Sri Lanka, he confronted an educational system in
high colonial mode. Students were given standard textbooks from England, in
which geography lessons stopped at the Suez Canal.39 They were asked to memorize
lists of plants and animals they would never see.40 Jennings recalled an English
lesson in British Malaya in which the students were being asked to memorize the
lines “O fair daffodils we weep to see you haste away so soon.”41 When the students
asked what daffodils were, they were told not to worry about it, as it would not be
on the exam.42 Jennings was shocked by such imperialist modes of education, and
from the beginning, he sought to develop education that would be locally useful in
Sri Lanka.43
Constitutions, of course, are a bit like educational systems—they need to
include common elements with the rest of the world, but also to be tailored to local
conditions. With this view in mind, Jennings became a key constitutional advisor
for the Sri Lankans, serving from 1942-1948.44 His closest interlocutor was D. S.
Senanayake, who eventually became the first prime minister of Ceylon in 1947. With
his intimate knowledge of British political culture, Jennings would prep Senanayake
and other leaders as to how to make their case to the colonial office. He analogized
the process to a game of bridge, in which the British would obey the rules.45 With
Jennings advising them, the analogy suggested, Sri Lankans could play the right

36. CF. DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE (2015).
37.
See SIR WILLIAM IVOR JENNINGS, THE ROAD TO PERADENIYA 83 (Henry Alfred Ian
Goonetileke ed., 2005); see generally H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKER: SELECTED
WRITINGS OF SIR IVOR JENNINGS (2015).
38.
See SIR WILLIAM IVOR JENNINGS, THE ROAD TO PERADENIYA 83 (Henry Alfred Ian
Goonetileke ed., 2005).
39. Id. at 101.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 100.
42. JENNINGS, supra note 38, at 100-01.
43. See id. at 95-102.
44. See id. at 162-77.
45. See id. at 175-76.
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cards, but Jennings’s role was not appreciated by the British Foreign Office, which
sought to control the negotiations.46
The basic constitutional problem Jennings confronted was that the Ceylonese
wished for independence immediately, while the colonial authorities thought they
were still unfit for self-governance. Jennings came down on the side of the locals,
and targeted the British idea of Dominion status, applicable to countries like
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, allowing for independent statehood within the
British Empire, while retaining the British Crown as head of state.47 Senanayake’s
political powers of persuasion helped convince the Colonial Office to support this
view. Jennings was later involved in constitution-making in Pakistan, Malaysia,
Singapore, Malta, the Maldives, Ghana, Guyana, Eritrea, and Nepal.48 He continued,
on occasion, to bite the hand that fed him, siding with the king in Nepal against the
foreign office.49 A relentless workaholic, he noted that “what troubles me is that
there is so much to be done and so little time to do it.”50
4.

The New Americans

The period after World War II was one of American dominance in
international affairs, and this was reflected in constitutional design as in other fields.
It was most apparent in cases of military occupations. Carl Friedrich, a Harvard
political scientist, worked on the postwar German Constitution;51 the more famous
case of the postwar Constitution of Japan reflected the direct influence of the
American drafters working for the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
(SCAP).52 Unsurprisingly, some of the draft language made little sense in the local
idiom. The description of rights as the “fruit of mankind’s age-old struggle to be
free”—included at the insistence of MacArthur’s aide General Whitney—is almost
unintelligible in Japanese, and clearly a tip-off for the foreign origin of the

46. See CHARLES PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DECOLONIZATION 80 (Alfred William
Brian Simpson ed., 2007).
47. JENNINGS, supra note 38 at 174.
48. PARKINSON, supra note 46, at 29; see also H. Kumarasingham, A Transnational Actor on a
Dramatic Stage – Sir Ivor Jennings and the Manipulation of Westminster Style Democracy in Pakistan, 2 U.C.
IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP. L. 33 (2017).
49. Mara Malagodi, Constitution Drafting as Cold War Realpolitik: Sir Ivor Jennings and Nepal’s 1959
Constitution, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA - DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 154, 154-72 (H. Kumarasingham, ed., 2016)
50. JENNINGS, supra note 38, at 83.
51.
Joseph Berger, Carl Friedrich Dies at 83: Influential Harvard Professor, NY TIMES, Sept. 22,
1984,
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/22/obituaries/carl-j-friedrich-dies-at-83-influentialharvard-professor.html [last accessed Jan. 11, 2017].
52.
RAY A. MOORE AND DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY (2004);
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul: Constitution-making in Occupied
States, 49 WM & MARY L. REV. 1139-78 (2008); David Law, The Myth of the Imposed Constitution, in SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 239, 239-68 (Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg
eds., 2010).
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document.53 To be sure, the Japanese Government pretended to have written the
text.54 For several months over the summer of 1946, the Japanese Diet debated the
draft, making a few amendments, but preserving the basic core.55 The charade that
Japanese had drafted the text is itself telling. Even if foreigners did write
constitutions, it would undermine the legitimacy and probability of adoption of the
resulting document to talk about it. Since local ownership is required to make
constitutions work, foreign bragging tends to be counterproductive.
The immediate postwar period saw the writing of dozens of new constitutions
as former colonial empires broke up. The United States played a role in some of
these, but in other cases, the political dominance of the United States led some to
avoid the American model.56 The drafters of the Constitution of India, in particular,
were intent on avoiding American approaches.57 Their decision to opt for a
parliamentary rather than presidential form of government and their commitment
to using the constitution for social transformation reflect this inclination. The
drafters of India’s constitution included a plethora of British-trained lawyers:
indeed, one account suggests that 2/3 of the important players were lawyers.58 Yet
even in this case, foreigners had some indirect influence. B.N. Rau, the
constitutional advisor to the Indian Constituent Assembly, discussed the draft with
several American professors as well as members of the United States Supreme
Court.59 (He also visited England, Ireland, and Canada in his research, and looked
at dozens of other countries’ constitutions in formulating his recommendations.)60
Justice Felix Frankfurter successfully encouraged Rau to eliminate the general
phrase “due process of law” from the Indian Constitution, informed by his dislike
of judicial activism involving so-called “substantive” due process.61 The Indians
instead borrowed the phrase “except according to procedure established by law,”
from the just-adopted 1946 Japanese Constitution.62 But that, of course, was itself
an American product.
Later-Justice Thurgood Marshall played a role advising Kenya on its
independence constitution in 1960, borrowing extensively from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the constitutions of two newly independent

53. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul: Constitution-making
in Occupied States, 49 WM & MARY L. REV. 1139, 1161 (2008).
54. See id. at 1162.
55. Id.
56. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying CrossConstitutional Influence through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 302 (2003) (discussing aversive
constitutionalism).
57. See GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 2739 (1966).
58. See id. at 337-44.
59. Id. at 103.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 104.
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countries, Nigeria and Malaya.63 Other American advisors played similar roles in
various parts of Africa and Asia, but the much more prevalent model was a
negotiated constitutional exit managed by the British or French colonial
authorities.64 Constitutions in many countries were simply colonial gifts, a quid pro
quo in exchange for granting independence, and they sometimes reflected colonial
interests.65
In the early years of the Eastern European constitution-making exercises after
1990, some American lawyers became highly sought after. One was A.E. Dick
Howard, a professor at the University of Virginia Law School who had played a
major role in re-drafting his state constitution in 1971. Howard traveled to many of
the countries in Eastern Europe on behalf of USAID, and worked on the
constitutions of ten countries.66 “The great ideals of American freedom,” he wrote,
“travel well”67 and so, it seems, did he. Another peripatetic figure during this period
was Albert Blaustein, a law librarian from Rutgers Law School. His first involvement
in this kind of work came in the 1960s when he was asked to help build a law library
for a new law school being created in Liberia.68 He later compiled a large collection
of constitutional texts.69 He parlayed this experience into a second career as a
constitutional advisor, including in his résumé advisory roles in Bangladesh, Brazil,
Mozambique, Namibia, Cambodia, Liberia, Niger, Peru, Fiji, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe.70 He also contributed to processes in Romania, Poland, Slovenia,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Lithuania.71 Blaustein later produced a “checklist” for
constitutional designers, and some assert that he used “cut-and-paste” techniques
from the compendium of other texts in dispensing his advice.72 When a reporter
called him ‘‘The Johnny Appleseed of Constitutions”, Blaustein immodestly replied,
“I prefer the Jewish James Madison.”73
5.

Localism and Universalism

In some cases, advisors bring their own political biases and concerns to bear
on supposedly national texts. Take the Constitution of Malaya (now known as
63. PARKINSON, supra note 46, at 221-25.
64. Id.
65. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Writing Rights (Mar. 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
66. See Barbara Perry, Constitutional Johnny Appleseeds, 55 ALB. L. REV. 767, 768 (1991) (discussing
the historical contribution of the United States to foreign constitutions).
67. A.E. DICK HOWARD, DEMOCRACY’S DAWN: A DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES
ON CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTER EUROPE
8 (1991).
68. Perry, supra note 66, at 778.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Perry, supra note 66, at 782-83.
73.
Ron Avery, A Man of Strong Constitution Law Prof Helps Ex-Reds Rewrite Framework of
Government, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 1990, http://articles.philly.com/1990-09-17/news
/25877043_1_new-constitution-oleg-g-rumyantsev-law-professor.
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Malaysia). As the country was preparing for independence from Britain in 1956,
British and Malaysian politicians agreed to form a drafting commission for a new
constitution.74 Headed by Sir William Reid, a distinguished British jurist, it included
Ivor Jennings along with a former governor-general of Australia and judges from
India and Pakistan.75 No Malaysian was included in the Reid Commission, but it
was understood that the local rulers and politicians would have to sign off on its
product.
Malaysia is a complicated place, with a majority of its population Muslim
Malays but also substantial minorities of people of Chinese and Indian descent who
moved there during the colonial period. Relations among these groups have varied
over time, and the British established a system of privileges for the “indigenous”
Malays, who were seen as economically backward relative to the other groups.76
Much like a contemporary affirmative action program, these privileges included land
reservations, and quotas for public sector jobs, business licenses and university
scholarships.77 The challenge for the Reid Commission was to reconcile these
privileges with principles of equality, and it proposed that the privileges be
temporarily extended for fifteen years. In this case, the drafters were trying to
preserve a set of local institutions that were themselves of colonial origin. The
consequences were significant, as Malaysia largely retains the affirmative action
scheme more than five decades later, arguably a major factor in keeping it in the
“Middle-Income Trap.”78
In recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of Malaysian society, the first draft
of the constitution did not mention an official religion, and the various princes of
the component states supported this position. However, the Pakistani delegate, a
judge named Abdul Hamid, who had served as a drafter on his own country’s
constituent assembly, strongly insisted that Islam had to be the official religion.79
Hamid’s motives may have had more to do with the justification for the creation of
Pakistan a decade earlier than his views as to what was appropriate for Malaya,
which was less than 60% Muslim at the time. Whatever the motive, Hamid’s
insistence had significant consequences for Malaysia down the road. Today, all
ethnic Malays are defined as Muslim, and until recently could not convert out of the

74.
Joseph M. Fernando, Constitutionalism and the Politics of Constitution-making in Malaya, in
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA - DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 137, 141-42 (Harshan Kumarasingham, ed., 2016).
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id. at 144.
77. K.S. Jomo, Whither Malaysia’s New Economic Policy? 63 PAC. AFF. 469 (1990-1991).
78.
Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Law and Development in Middle-Income Countries, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 21, 26 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
79. Joseph Fernando, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, 37 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN
STUD. 249, 256 (2006).
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religion.80 This position was confirmed in an important legal case 2007 when a
young Malay woman, Lina Joy, sought to have the state recognize her conversion
to Christianity. 81 The courts refused to allow this.82 Malaysia remains an ethnically
and religiously polarized place. Might it have been different if the status of religion
had been left to the locals?83
6.

The People are the Client: Yash Ghai

The world’s leading constitutional drafter today is Professor Yash Ghai, a
Kenyan of East Indian origin who taught at the University of Hong Kong for many
years. This cosmopolitan background and a deep knowledge, from both personal
and academic experience, of situations of ethnic diversity have rendered him the
leading person in the field. Frequently working with his wife, the distinguished law
professor Jill Cottrell, Ghai has been involved in constitutions in Kenya, Papua New
Guinea, Nepal, Libya, Somalia, Fiji and many others.84 He has taken an admirable
and rare interest in the constitutions of small developing countries. Such countries
may be more open to outside assistance in formulating their constitutions, and Ghai
has frequently been asked to chair drafting commissions in quite public
circumstances. This sometimes gets him into trouble.
In 2012, Ghai travelled to Fiji, where strongman Voreqe Bainimarama sought
to legitimate his rule with a transition to a new constitution.85 (He had overthrown
the previous constitution in a coup and had been appointed prime minister in 2009
after a constitutional suspension.) Ghai’s good friend and former student Aiyaz
Sayed-Khaiyum was a senior Indo-Fijian politician, and suggested that Ghai become
involved in the Constitutional Commission that was to draft a new document.86
What better way for the Fijians to legitimate the transition to democracy than having
the world’s leading constitution-maker at the head of the process? At the same time,
the presidential decrees promised a restoration of true democracy, and mandated

80. Ida Lim, Path to Leave Islam Simple, but Far from Easy. MALAY MAIL ONLINE, July 12, 2014,
http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/path-to-leave-islam-simple-but-far-from-easy
[last accessed Jan. 12, 2017].
81. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agam Islam Wilayah Persekutan and Ors. [2004] 2 MLJ 219.
82.
Id.
83. If Abdul Hamid’s views on religion seem to privilege one of Malaysia’s groups over others,
he also brought with him a prescient awareness of the dangers of emergency rule. He argued for strictly
limited emergency powers, though this suggestion was rejected. Emergency powers were abused for
many years thereafter in Malaysia (and in Pakistan as well).
84. In a 2005 paper, he lists Seychelles, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji,
East Timor, Afghanistan and reviews in Tanzania, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Maldives, Zambia and Kenya.
Yash Ghai, “A Journey Around Constitutions: Reflections on Contemporary Constitutions” 122 S. AFR. L. J. 804,
804 n.1 (2005).
85.
Yash Ghai Speaks on Fiji Constitution Plan, RADIO N.Z. NEWS, 13 Mar. 2012,
http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/203189/yash-ghai-speaks-on-fiji-constitutionplan.
86.
Graham Davis, Yash Ghai: Emotion Before Reason, GRUBSHEET FEEJEE, Jan. 8, 2013,
http://www.grubsheet.com.au/yash-ghai-emotion-before-reason/?doing_wp_cron=1484250188
.1356310844421386718750.
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that the constitution protect human rights and be built through popular
participation. It seemed a good gamble.
The formal mandate of the Constitutional Commission was to produce a draft
which would be submitted to a constituent assembly, and to engage in wide
consultations.87 The government insisted that the drafting process would give
“every Fijian a voice.”88 There were a few red lines given to the commission by the
government: these included the need to grant immunity for the coup-makers in
previous governments, a one-person one-vote electoral scheme, and human rights
protections.89 The immunity requirement, along with prime ministerial control of
the review process, and gag orders on the constituent assembly that was to approve
the draft, generated some international controversy, as it seemed to provide for veto
points for the current power holders.90
This assignment obviously posed some risks for Ghai, but, perhaps out of a
deep optimism, he went ahead and agreed to participate in the drafting process.
Foreign donors, including Australia, New Zealand, and Britain, provided funding,
which helped ensure that at least some degree of independence could be
maintained.91 Joining Ghai on the commission was Christina Murray, who had
worked on the South African Constitution and the Constitution of Kenya 2010, as
well as three Fijians picked by the government.92 Ghai’s spouse Jill Cottrell was a
researcher. The group proceeded to engage with a broad range of civil society actors,
and to organize training sessions in the basic approaches to institutional design. It
received over 7000 submissions from the public with ideas for the constitution, a
remarkable number in a semi-literate country.93
Things began to go south when Ghai sought to push in a democratic direction
and to appeal directly to the people over the government.94 This meant that he
stepped out of the role of being a mere advisor, to become a political actor in his
own right. In part this reflects Ghai’s view of the constitution-making mission.
Whereas a practicing lawyer might see the client as the government or funding
agency that hired him or her, Ghai’s view has always been that constitutions are
written for the people, and should be written on their behalf to the extent possible.95
In other words, the people, not the government, are the client.
87.
INT’L SENIOR LAWYERS PROJECT, ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT
RELEASED BY THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF FIJI ON 21 MAR. 2013, 1.

CONSTITUTION OF FIJI

88. Id.
89. Id. at 2.
90.
See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Fiji: Revise Draft Constitution to Protect Rights, Sept. 4, 2013
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/04/fiji-revise-draft-constitution-protect-rights
91.
Draft Constitution: The Explanatory Report, http://www.fijileaks.com/uploads/1/3/7
/5/13759434/thursday_the_explanatory_report_two-4.pdf, at 4.
92. Id. at ii.
93. INT’L SENIOR LAWYERS PROJECT, supra note 87.
94.
Wadan Narsey, Trashing the Ghai Constitution: The Positives, Jan. 14, 2013.
https://narseyonfiji.wordpress.com/2013/01/14/trashing-the-ghai-constitution-the-positives-14january-2013/
95. Personal communication.
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The government’s view differed. It saw the Constitutional Commission as
merely advisory to the government. It threatened Ghai with expulsion, and although
the commission then took a lower profile, things never got back on track.96 By
December 2012, the commission had produced a document with plenty of
democratic protections.97 This was surely a heroic achievement accomplished in a
very short period of time, but all the work went to naught. The commission’s draft
deviated from the instructions put to it on immunity.98 It only offered immunity for
coup participants who took an oath renouncing their support of illegal regimes and,
crucially, offered no immunity at all for those who had committed human rights
violations.99 Furthermore, the proposals on land and transitional provisions
generated controversy. As a result, the draft never saw the light of day. The
Constitutional Commission ordered some copies of the draft printed, but as it
waited for the books to come back from the printers, the government burned the
printers’ proofs.100 There was significant controversy over the precise sequence of
events, but some asserted that one of Ghai’s fellow commissioners had not known
about the printing. Political and media attacks followed. Bainimarama spuriously
accused the commission, especially Professor Ghai, of consorting with individuals
interested in making Fiji a Christian state.101 Ghai was also accused of working with
the political opposition.102 On March 21, 2013, Bainimarama’s government
published its own draft constitution, which had largely been written by Ghai’s
former student, the attorney general.103
This was hardly Ghai’s only experience with failure, yet many of his projects
have had an afterlife even beyond the death of the formal draft. He was extensively
involved in producing a draft for his native Kenya in 2004-2005, a project that
ultimately was rejected by politicians who had much to lose.104 The process involved
a huge constituent assembly of 600 people, and extensive efforts to educate the
public. Reflecting on the situation in 2005, he asked, “[m]ight it have been wiser to
have opted for less radical change and carried the politicians with use, even if it
meant ignoring the people?”105 However, in the aftermath of electoral violence and
a significant international effort to get the country back on track, many of his ideas
made it into the 2010 constitution, which was a watershed in Kenyan history.

96. Narsey, supra note 94.
97. Draft Constitution: The Explanatory Report, supra note 91, at 61.
98. Narsey, supra note 94.
99. Draft Constitution: The Explanatory Report, supra note 91, at 101.
100. Fiji Regime Breaks Silence over Constitution Draft Burning, RADIO N.Z. NEWS, Jan. 10,
2013, http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/209542/fiji-regime-breaks-silence-overconstitution-draft-burning.
101.
PMs Attack is Unfair, says Fiji’s Constitution Chair Prof. Ghai, PAC. ISLANDS NEWS ASS’N,
Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.pina.com.fj/?p=pacnews&m=read&o=2245903325096d7e5e1052d7ee593d.
102. Id.
103. Constitutionnet, Constitutional History of Fiji, http://www.constitutionnet.org/country
/constitutional-history-fiji.
104. Ghai, supra note 84, at 828.
105. Id.
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Ghai is noteworthy for recognizing an evolution in the role for constitutional
advisors. Whereas someone like Jennings saw himself as primarily a technician
trying to tailor a text to a particular set of local circumstances, Ghai sees the role of
the modern constitutional advisor as much more complex. The advisor, in his view,
must sometimes be an educator, sometimes be a negotiator, and sometimes play the
role of facilitating broader participation beyond a narrow set of elites.106 As an
educator, the advisor must help to explain what has and has not worked to the
political forces negotiating the constitution. As a negotiator, the advisor must
sometimes engage in conflict resolution to help discover shared interests. And as a
facilitator, the advisor must remember that the people are the ultimate source of
sovereignty, whose participation can help to ensure that the constitution is
successful.
7.

The Lefties

Constitutional advice is a subsidy of information and ideas, and so it is perhaps
unsurprising that the providers will have motives of their own. An important source
of ideas for recent constitution-makers in Latin America has been a Spanish thinktank, the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Sociales (CEPS), based in Valencia and
dedicated to critique of capitalism and encouraging processes of social
transformation. These include Professor Roberto Viciano Pastor, a prolific scholar
who had a role in advising constitution-makers in Ecuador in 1998, Venezuela in
1999, Ecuador in 2008, and Bolivia in 2008, and his colleague Rubén Martínez
Dalmau, who worked on the latter three constitutions. Their involvement led to
controversy in both Spain and Latin America. One Spanish newspaper described
Viciano as the “gray matter” for controversial president Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela.107 While the advisors tended to focus more on abstract ideas, on
occasion they had significant impact. For example, they successfully argued for a
unicameral legislature in Venezuela, though Chávez initially wanted a bicameral
legislature.108
The advisors portrayed their role as more technical than substantive. But
concerns over Viciano’s role in advising the president of Ecuador’s constitutional
assembly led him to deny that the Spaniards played a role.109 Kinnto Lucas, who
later had his 15 minutes of fame as the deputy foreign minister to grant asylum to
Wikileaks founder and accused rapist Julian Assange, noted, “I always disagreed
with their presence, because I believed that they truly didn’t know the country.”110
Indeed, Viciano criticized the final Bolivian Constitution as involving too
many concessions to the rightist political opposition. “This is what those who call
106. Id. at 805.
107. Joshua Partlow, Latin America’s Document-Driven Revolutions, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601468_2.html.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Partlow, supra note 107.
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themselves revolutionary sometimes don’t understand: In the revolution, you can’t
always reach consensus,” Viciano was quoted as saying, “[y]ou either have
revolution or you don’t. But you can’t force consensus.”111 The point is that even
governments that decry the role of transnational empire are customers for
transnational constitutional advice, in this case from ideological allies in the country
of the conquistadores, who were purer than the pope. So much for a neat division
of the world into south and north.
8.

Agents and Structure

The above vignettes identify individual advisors and their influence, but one
must also consider the role of structure in the selection and empowerment of
advisors. No doubt the selection of individuals is not random but responds to the
conditions of the situation. Frank Goodnow spoke patronizingly of his Chinese
interlocutors, but it is also clear that they were using him to legitimate their own
goals in the eyes of outside constituencies. Foreigners can both provide and signal
genuine disinterest, a real virtue in constitutional design.112 In that sense,
constitutional advice giving should be understood not just as transnational
transplant of ideas from outside, but also as a version of “palace wars” involving
internal and external struggles among different groups.113 The TLO framework
highlights such struggles, which might involve transnational coalitions of those
involved in transitional justice, economic liberalization and human rights.
Notwithstanding these structural determinants, it also seems to be the case
that individuals do have consequential impact. Had a Pakistani Sikh rather than a
Muslim been brought in to advise on Malaysia’s Constitution, the product might
have been profoundly different. But there are real and genuine constraints on what
is possible in any given situation. Our focus on the agent should not distract from
the structures that drive outcomes, and here there may be room for further
elaboration within the TLO framework.114
TOWARD TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION
The pace and intensity of transnational involvement in constitution-making
has intensified since 1990. That year saw the end of the Cold War and the beginning
of a set of major overhauls of constitutions in many countries. It coincided with the
“rule of law revival” in which foreign development agencies were increasingly
concerned with the role of law in fostering economic development and political

111. Id.
112. Adriaan Lanni & Adrian Vermuele, Constitutional Design in the Ancient World, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 907, 932-34 (2012).
113.
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS 7 (2010) (elaborating on palace wars metaphor).
114. See HALLIDAY & SHAFFER, supra note 2.
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stability.115 Two key features of the new era are first, that it is institutions rather than
individuals that are the primary vehicles for advice, and second, that the field is
increasingly crowded and competitive.
In the early years after 1990, American organizations like The Asia Foundation
and the newly established National Endowment for Democracy engaged in
constitutional support in multiple countries.116 Bilateral donors too sought to get
involved. Both the American military and USAID have had a bias toward
constitutions, while other donors have focused on institutions like the civil code or
judicial reform. In situations like post-conflict Cambodia or East Timor, where the
UN has an official role in transitional administration, the UN plays an active role to
be described in a bit more depth below. In major instances of invasion and
occupation, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN and United States are major players
in some tension with each other, while myriad other actors are also involved.117
To give one example of how these forces interact, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement between the warring Sudan and South Sudanese factions in 2005
featured an extensive bill of rights reportedly drafted by an American legal advisor
to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat for Peace
in Sudan, sponsored by the US State Department.118 IGAD is a regional
organization, primarily funded by outside countries, which among other tasks
served to facilitate the peace negotiations between the north and south regions of
Sudan.119 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in turn led to an interim
constitution, and then a transitional constitution that still governs the young nation
of South Sudan today.120 Several organizations, including an American law firm, the
National Democratic Institute, and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public
Law and International Law in Heidelberg, claimed to have influenced the rights
provisions in the Interim Constitution.121 Later, the Transitional Constitution of
South Sudan 2011 was drafted with the assistance of the Public Interest Law and
Policy Group (PILPG) based in Washington DC, as well as other international
organizations like the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, the US Institute of Peace, and the International Development
Law Organization.122 The involvement of all these players meant that the South

115.
See THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE (2006); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179 (1999).
116. Author’s disclosure: I worked for the Asia Foundation on constitutions during this period.
117.
VIJAYASHRI SRIPATI, UN CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMERGENT POLICY
INSTITUTION, Paper 5 (York Centre for Public Policy & Law 2009), http://digitalcommons
.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=ycppl.
118. Cope, supra note 1, at 692.
119. Id.
120. Kevin Cope, South Sudan’s Dualistic Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 295, 302-03 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2013).
121. Id. at 304.
122. Id. at 307-08.
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Sudanese drafters had to spend a good deal of time coordinating with the donors,
while trying to soak up the myriad and sometimes conflicting advice they received.
It is not surprising that they found the drafting process challenging at times.
Similarly, the recent wave of constitution-making in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring generated demand for outside assistance. Constitutional exercises in Libya,
Tunisia, and Yemen featured an array of foreign actors. International IDEA,
German NGO Democracy Reporting International, the UN, and the American
party organizations—the National Democratic Institute and the International
Republican Institute, were all involved in various countries. In Tunisia, various
German foundations, such as the Konrad Adenaeur and Hans Siedel Foundation,
were also involved, as were French institutions, and the Max Planck Institute for
Public Comparative Law and Public International Law, Heidelberg.
Only in Egypt were foreign organizations shut out. As the Muslim
Brotherhood-dominated constituent assembly sought to produce a draft in 2012, it
made quite clear that it was not interested in foreign advice. No doubt their culture
of distrust toward Western states that had supported the Mubarak regime for three
decades was part of the motive. The broader conspiracy theories that inform
Egyptian political life did not help. But ultimately, they may have been afraid of the
message that international actors might have delivered: to be more inclusive.123 Had
foreign advisors been involved, they would have likely argued what has become a
standard line: constitutions should be produced in an open process with
participation from as broad a swath of the population as possible. Constitutions that
are produced in open processes are likely to be more legitimate, it is often asserted.
What is surprising is that this message is often delivered by the ultimate international
actor, the UN, which has become an important player in the world of constitutional
advice, and to which we now turn.
SPEAKING FROM ABOVE FOR THOSE BELOW: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONS
The end of the Cold War has seen the re-invigoration of the UN as a central
actor in state building. Frequently called on to help countries transition out of civil
war and conflict, the UN has set up missions in countries as diverse as Kosovo,
East Timor, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.124 In the course of

123.
Perhaps this attitude explains the extraordinarily short life of their product, which was
suspended in mid-2013, just seven months after coming into effect. After all, with few international
actors invested in the process, the military may have thought little of suspending the Egyptian
Constitution in June 2013.
124.
An incomplete list includes Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo,
East-Timor, Eritrea, Guatemala, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and
Yemen. Support in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Nepal, Somalia, and Yemen has come through UN special
political missions and to the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire through the
UN’s Peace-building Support Offices and Mediation Support Unit. The UNDP (the United Nations
Development Program), has supported constitution-making in Burundi, Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Malawi, the Maldives, Nauru, Solomon Islands,
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these interventions, the UN has accumulated considerable experience in
constitutional design, though its internal efforts (and their external legitimacy) vary
from context to context. Cambodia’s 1993 Constitution, for example, was formally
produced by an elected constituent assembly, but was organized by the United
National Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC), which was charged for
conducting elections and organizing a process of state transformation.125 Similarly,
in 1990 Namibia was midwifed by the UN, and its constituent assembly used the
1992 Constitutional Principles contained in a report from the secretary-general and
endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 435.126 Many of these situations
involve countries emerging from violent conflict, leading to an emerging field of
“peace-building.”
Beyond knowledge, foreign institutions in general, and the UN in particular,
can play a role in encouraging agreement among local factions that are often at the
verge of violent conflict. The UN is a large, often-dysfunctional bureaucracy, but it
does bring special resources to bear in terms of international legitimacy that, say, a
bilateral donor may not have.127 Many members of its staff have extensive
negotiating experience.128
This is not to say that it is a truly neutral actor, whatever that might mean. The
UN claims to respect national ownership of sovereign processes, and on the ground
it emphasizes the role of public participation.129 But the UN is also bound by its
charter to promote adherence to international human rights and the rule of law.130
There is an obvious tension here—global standards will sometimes conflict with
local cultural norms.
In 2006, in recognition of this increasing demand for involvement in
constitution-building, a high-level committee in the UN endorsed a program to
review its constitution-making assistance and prepare further guidance.131 This
culminated in 2009 in the release of a Guidance Note from the Secretary General
on United Nations Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes.132 This in turn
Tokelau, and Zambia. See VIJAYASHRI SRIPATI, UN CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMERGENT
POLICY INSTITUTION, Paper 5 (York Centre for Public Policy & Law 2009),
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=ycppl.
125. Stephen P. Marks, The Process of Creating a Constitution for Cambodia, in FRAMING THE STATE
IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 207, 234 (Laurel Miller ed.,
2009).
126.
Marinus Wiechers, Namibia’s Long Walk to Freedom: The Role of Constitution Making in the
Creation of an Independent Namibia, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 81, 91 (Laurel Miller ed., 2009).
127. Since 2008, many experts are located in the Mediation Support Unit of the Department
of Political Affairs, which as a team of “Standby Experts” who deploy to different places.
128. Nancee Oku Bright, Negotiating to Save Lives, 48 UN CHRON., July 2011.
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reiterates that constitution-making is “a sovereign national process, which, to be
legitimate and successful, must be nationally owned and led.”133 Yet it also requires
its agents to promote particular values:
The UN should consistently promote compliance of constitutions with
international human rights and other norms and standards. Thus, it should
speak out when a draft constitution does not comply with these standards,
especially as they relate to the administration of justice, transitional justice,
electoral systems and a range of other constitutional issues . . . . The UN
should address the rights that have been established under international
law for groups that may be subjected to marginalization and discrimination
in the country, including women, children, minorities, indigenous peoples,
refugees, and stateless and displaced persons. For example, the principle
of equality between men and women should be embedded in constitutions,
and states should be encouraged to consider special provisions on children
recognizing their status as subjects of human rights.134
All this seems unobjectionable from an international perspective, but in some
societies may be deeply resisted by conservative social and religious forces. There is
an irony that an international organization which is itself involved in imposing
certain ideas is also the body that urges local participation in the process, and
safeguards participation as a key process value.
Notwithstanding its internal tensions, the secretary general’s note is a kind of
soft law guidance, with actual regulatory effect for internal UN actors. These are
myriad, and the internecine UN politics in any given situation can be intense.
Beyond whatever country mission has been established, the UN Entity for Gender
Equality and the Empowerment of Women will seek to ensure compliance with
global gender norms, the Mediation Support Unit will seek to provide technical
advice, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will often be
involved as the lead agency in-country. This has led to the creation of a
Constitutional Focal Point within the UN.135 Institutionalization is proceeding; but
there are many drafting situations in which the UN is not a preferred partner, after
having antagonized locals with its heavy-handed normative biases, its
bureaucratism, and its alliance with particular actors.
NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT: A QUALIFIED DEFENSE OF ADVICE
The ideal role of the constitutional advisor might seem to be to provide
information to local decision-makers. The locals represent “we the people” who will
make the final choices about what institutions are appropriate for the local context.
But all constitutional drafters bring their own perspectives and backgrounds, and
these may sometimes affect the advice they are giving.

133. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 132, at 2.
134. Id. at 4.
135.
DPA Constitutional Focal Point Fact Sheet, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites
/peacemaker.un.org/files/ConstitutionMaking_Factsheet_May2016.pdf.
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One need not dig far to find those who style themselves constitutional
advisors. In a recent interview, a law school applicant claimed to have played a major
role in drafting the proposed constitution of Tunisia on the basis of a student
project at Cambridge University.136 Harvard law professor Noah Feldman is
regularly asserted to have drafted the Constitution of Iraq,137 notwithstanding the
fact that he was nowhere near the country during the period when all the crucial
provisions were negotiated.138
To judge from these and many others, foreigners play a major role in
constitutional design. What are we to make of these claims? They are yet another
indicator of our Twitter-laden era of self-promotion. They also reflect the natural
interest of the public and the media in constitutions, which have an appeal as the
highest legal acts of the state. In the case of academics and foreign donors, showing
policy impact can be important professionally, and there is no higher-impact
enterprise than constitution-making. But fundamentally these claims reflect a
complete misunderstanding of the way constitutions are—and always have been—
written. Constitutions are collective products, not written by single individuals. And
while outsiders have always played an important role, the ultimate acts of adoption
must, by definition, be done by insiders with the requisite political authority. We the
people always trumps Me the People.
The need to balance between local and international norms has been a
constant theme in constitution-making. The reason for seeking outside expertise is
simple. Writing a constitution is a tough task, even at a purely technical level. Trying
to figure out the myriad tradeoffs involved among different institutions, and the
likely effects of particular provisions, is a complex matter, requiring a sense of both
local context but also what is sometimes called “social science knowledge.”139 Even
if interests of the main stakeholders can be aligned, they need to be able to estimate
the likely effects of their institutional choices. To do the job requires knowing a lot
about the local context, about different institutional designs, and about what is
politically possible to achieve. Surely it is a project that takes a proverbial village.
136. Subhabrata Guhal, Indian Helped Draft Tunisia’s Constitution, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 9, 2014
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/nri/other-news/Indian-helped-draft-Tunisias-constitution
/articleshow/30079524.cms (discussing Riddhi Dasgupta).
137. See After You (Review of Cool War: The Future of Global Competition, Noah Feldman), THE
ECONOMIST (July 15, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21579430-willbipolar-world-be-peaceful-after-you.
138. Feldman served as a senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority from April to
July 2003, LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE
BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 49 (2007), but does not seem to have been
involved in the actual process of drafting either the Transitional Administrative Law of 2004 or the
Constitution of 2005, PAUL BREMER, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A FUTURE OF
HOPE 288, 293 (Simon and Schuster, 2006), and none of the major accounts mention him. See Ashley
S. Deeks & Mathew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 1-87
(2007).
139.
DONALD W. FISKE AND RICHARD A. SHWEDER, METATHEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE:
PLURALISMS AND SUBJECTIVITIES VII (Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder eds., 1986)
(discussing social science knowledge).
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In such a context, outsiders have a role to play. Local constitution-makers
could, in theory, adopt the view that their situation is unique and that there is little
to be learned from other countries. Some drafters do create innovative institutions
from local tradition. But the very categories used in government tend to be similar
across countries: most countries will adopt a legislature and an executive headed by
a president or prime minister; most will promise their citizens “rights”; and most
will consider how the national government interacts with those from lower levels.
We might put local names on these institutions: the Mongolian legislature, for
example, is called a “hural” after the traditional Mongolian assemblies.140 The first
modern government of the country used the term in the 1920s and so it stuck.141 In
societies with Persian influence the legislature is called a majlis.142 But regardless of
the name, it is still a legislature.
Once it is recognized that institutions have been used in other countries, it
would be quite irrational to ignore prior experience, even if it is foreign.
Furthermore, unlike normal “products,” there is little incentive for innovation.
Unlike producers who seek to maximize profits in a competitive marketplace,
drafters of constitutions do not acquire a property right in any new ideas they come
up with. Nor can they easily sell their ideas to other countries. Once embedded in a
new constitution, ideas and institutions are publicly available for all to see.
One way to think the role of foreign advisors is that they offer a subsidy of
knowledge. The international community can quickly bring a lot of relevant
information to bear, not to dictate choices but to help lay out options for local
drafters. Subsidizing the gathering of information can save a local drafter a lot of
time and effort. Consider the alternative option for drafters. They could sit down
with the myriad texts that have been produced by other countries. They could study
comparative law and politics. But surely it makes far more sense to bring in an
outsider or two who has some comparative knowledge.
If one danger is imposing an overly rigid archetype without tailoring to the
local conditions, there may be another danger in being too sensitive to the interests
of those currently in power. After all, the drafters of a constitution have enormous
opportunities for enhancing their own authority and power. The advisor is usually
hired by someone. Who is the client? Is it the nation as a whole, or the particular
individual who hires the advisor? There has been very little attention to the ethics
of advice giving, and occasionally, as in the case with Peter Galbraith in Iraq,
unethical behavior occurs.143 One might expect that if constitutional advice is to
emerge as a full-blown field of expertise, akin to other TLOs, it might be
accompanied by pressures to adopt professional ethics.

140. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 162 (2003).
141. Const. Mongolia art. 4 (1924).
142. See, e.g., Const. Iran art. 89 (1989); Const. Azerbaijan art. 81 (1995).
143. In a slightly different context, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are there Systemic Ethics Issues in
Dispute Settlement System Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About it: Lessons from International and
Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 195-232 (2009).
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COMPETITION FOR CONSTITUTIONS
In a contemporary drafting situation, many different actors—states,
academics, international organizations, advocacy groups—are in some sense
competing with each other to influence the final shape of the constitutional
document, just as local political forces compete for advantage in negotiating the
outcome. Each outside actor brings particular strengths and weaknesses. Whereas
the UN brings a particular form of international legitimacy, and the weight to
negotiate with powerful actors like the United States, bilateral donors may bring
greater speed and flexibility. Norway, for example has established an expertise in
international conflict resolution that has allowed it to play outsized roles in
constitutional-conundra like Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka.144 However, bilateral
donors are also constrained by their own national interests, which naturally weigh
heavily on the choice of content and the local partners who are favored.
In Europe, the European Union has played a role in constraining constitutionmaking, especially in recent years when Article 2 of the treaty has come into play in
the rightward turn in Central and Eastern Europe.145 The Venice Commission on
Democracy through Law, part of the Council of Europe, has played an active role
in formulating advice to constitutional reform efforts in Europe and beyond.146 It
has expanded its role since allowing the extension of membership by countries from
outside the region, and now has nearly 60 member states.147 The Venice
Commission has no binding power, but has the advantage of an association with
Europe, giving it implicitly the pull of the European Union, and perhaps an implicit
threat of collateral consequences from European governments.148 The downside is
that its composition is overwhelmingly composed of senior academics and
constitutional court judges; there is no social science expertise, and few have any

144. Statement by Mr. Jan Petersen, Foreign Minister of Norway: Announcement of Sri Lanka
Ceasefire, Feb. 22, 2002, U.S Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Collection
http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-sri-lanka; See also Robert Freedman, The Middle
East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords, 6 ARAB STUD. J. 144 (1998).
145. Kim L. Scheppele, What Can the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic
Principles of the European Union? The Case for Systemic Infringement Actions, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov.
2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/45.princeton
universityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversion_en.pdf; Bojan Bugariÿ, Protecting
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the European Union: The Hungarian Challenge, (LONDON SCH. OF ECON.
EUR. IN QUESTION DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, LEQS Paper No. 79/2014, July 2014).
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/LEQSPaper79.p
df.
146. Maartje de Visser, A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice Commission in Processes of
Domestic Constitutional Reform, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 963, 964 (2015); see also Paul Craig, Transnational
Constitution-Making: The Contribution of the Venice Commission on Law and Democracy, 2 U.C. IRVINE J.
INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP. L. 57 (2017).
147. Id. at 969-70.
148. Id. at 991.
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experience drafting constitutions.149 Furthermore the membership is
overwhelmingly male.150
Smaller international organizations like International IDEA also have
developed specialized programs in constitution-making.151 The IDEA program
focuses on knowledge products, including a series of primers on constitutional
issues, as well as tailored constitutional advice to particular drafting situations.
Interpeace, a non-governmental organization based in Stockholm, has a program
focusing on constitutional processes.152 Region-specific organizations are also
involved. In addition, there are organizations that focus on substantive issues.
Besides the crowded human right space, there is the Forum on Federations, based
in Canada, which promotes federal governance.153
The point is that constitution-making is no longer as simple as gathering
representatives into a New England town hall to deliberate fundamental principles.
It involves a much more complex, transnational process. One way to think about
this process is that it is not only a competition among different actors, but a
competition among different forms of expertise.154 Law competes with political science,
economics and other disciplines; technocrats compete with interest groups to
articulate their positions. Myriad international organizations, both governmental
and intergovernmental, want to play a role in supporting constitution-making. A
national constitution is in some sense the ultimate achievement—it allows the donor
organization to claim credit, and show a track record of success. So there is a good
deal of supply-side pressure for constitutional advice, and subsidies for the
constitution-making process.
Constitution-making in this sense is part of a much broader movement that
has occurred over the last three decades, sometimes called the “rule-of-law”
movement or the “law and development” movement.155 Building on earlier efforts,
Western agencies, lawyers, and universities sought to transfer legal knowledge to the
developing world. As time has gone on, this movement has seen a gradual
empowerment of the “recipients” of legal knowledge. “Local ownership” is the holy
grail for donors, as they rightly understand that nothing can work if simply imposed
from outside. As more and more “suppliers” entered the field, the “buyers” of
information have more to choose from and are in a stronger position to negotiate
149.
Members of the Venice Commission, VENICE COMMISSION (Nov. 11, 2016, 2:22 PM),
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/default.aspx?lang=EN
150. Id. Twenty-nine out of 128 members listed on the website appear to be female.
151.
Disclosure: I serve as a Senior Advisor to the Constitution-Building Program of
International IDEA. Constitution-Building, INTERNATIONAL IDEA (Dec. 14, 2016, 10:03PM),
http://www.idea.int/our-work/what-we-do/constitution-building.
152. Constitution-Making, INTERPEACE (Dec. 14, 2016, 10:03PM), http://www.interpeace.org
/what-we-do/constitution-making-for-peace/.
153.
Who We Are, FORUM OF FEDERATIONS (Dec. 14, 2016, 10:04PM), http://www
.forumfed.org/who-we-are/.
154.
ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998).
155. CAROTHERS, supra note 115.
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the terms of assistance. The availability of electronic tools and the growth of human
capital in some developing countries mean that elites and drafters are also able to
become more sophisticated consumers.
All this competition to influence constitutional language should make it
abundantly clear that individuals do not draft these documents at all, and the
individual advisor is embedded in larger structural and institutional frameworks. Of
course, an individual drafter could conceivably do a better job than committee of
political representatives who often foist incoherent compromises in to
constitutional documents. The Ancient Greeks used to regularly appoint single
individuals to draft laws, including constitutions.156 Coming from outside of the
political structure, and usually being drawn from the middle class, these were the
ancestors of modern technocrats. But in the modern era, it is hard to imagine a
single individual having the wisdom and expertise to do so. There are, to put it
bluntly, no more Solons.157 Me, the People is always less legitimate than We, the
People. Constitutions must garner the consent of the people who are to live under
them, and this increasingly is seen to require a healthy dose of public participation.
As an aside, I cannot resist pointing out that the claims of foreign individuals
to have drafted particular documents are particularly ironic in the case of Iraq. The
Constitution of Iraq reflected a set of compromises achieved without the
participation of one of the major political forces of the country. Pushing a
constitution before there was a political agreement led directly to the horrific
violence and civil war of 2005-2009.158 Furthermore, the constitution is objectively
an incomplete document.159 It postpones major issues—the federal system, the
distribution of oil, the nature of the upper house of parliament—to future laws
which in many cases have never been passed.160 It is, at a technical level, a bad piece
of work. Why anyone would want to take credit for it is unclear. To use a medical
analogy, anyone who claims to have produced that document ought to be sued for
institutional malpractice. Far better to admit that the process is a collective one, in
which the credit—and blame—is shared.
Constitutions are always drafted in collective processes—and have to be. The
process involves various kinds of expertise—legal, political, technical. It requires
knowledge of international factors, including the different institutional options that
have been tried in foreign countries, and their performance. It also requires local
knowledge about what is politically and culturally possible. And it ultimately requires

156. Adriaan Lanni & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Design in the Ancient World, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 907, 918 (2012).
157. Id. at 909.
158. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, IRAQ: A Profile of The Internal Displacement
Situation 25 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010).
159. Ersin Kalaycioglu, Iraq’s Constitution Is Incomplete, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Oct. 29, 2005),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/36254.html; see also Abrak Saati,
Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and
Not in Others?, 2 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP. L. 113 (2017).
160. Id.
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bringing all these things together, to make informed choices about the likely
outcomes of institutions in a particular local context. It then requires a process of
soliciting local input into the design process, and a process of negotiating with
powerful stakeholders.
IS CONSTITUTION-MAKING A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?
We have described an increasingly institutionalized social field, in which
constitution-building has become its own field of expertise. Let us now turn to the
question posted at the outset: does it qualify as a transnational legal order? To
answer this we should isolate each element of the definition of the TLO. We have,
I think, demonstrated that the field is an inherently transnational one, and that it is
becoming increasingly institutionalized as transnational. But is constitution-making
a legal process? It clearly involves law, but the process is not itself governed by
transnational law. This exposes that the Halliday-Shaffer framework is a bit fuzzy
on the legal. Their definition characterizes something as legal if it involves a
transnational legal organization or network, directly engages multiple national legal
institutions, and assumes a recognizable legal form.161 This is a somewhat circular
definition in that it includes legal concepts in the elements that constitute something
as legal. Clearly the constitution-making network does act on law in multiple
countries, but does it “assume legal form?”
There is very little law that governs the constitution-making process itself. To
be sure, some norm entrepreneurs and the UN itself have sought to assert that there
is a right to public participation in the constitution-making process.162 Yet no one
would really question the idea that a constitution, made without participation but
universally recognized by its own subjects as in force, was in fact a constitution.
Normatively, the international community would surely prefer such a constitution
that was perfectly congruent with international substantive norms to one that was
highly defective but adopted in a participatory fashion. Even at a purely national
level, we do not always observe legal continuity in the sense that new constitutions
are produced under the rules set out in prior documents.163 In short, applying the
framework to constitution-making seems to call into question some aspects of the
definition, but the authors of the framework might respond, fairly enough, that the
legal nature of constitutions means that the TLO definition is satisfied on this point.
Third, is it a transnational legal order? Constitution-making as a field is highly
fragmented, with different organizations and individuals competing to provide
advice and to influence the process. There is intense competition in the process,

161. HALLIDAY & SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 11-12.
162. Vivian Hart, Democratic Constitution Making 1 (U.S. INST. OF PEACE, Special Report 107,
July 2003), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr107.pdf.
163.
Andrew Arato, Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models, principles and
elements of democratic constitution-making, 1 GLOB. CONSTITUTIONALISM 173, 178 (2012).

32

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law

[Vol. 2:5

and many of the actors are themselves TLOs.164 For this reason, we prefer to treat
constitution-making as a field which serves as an arena for other TLOs to engage.
The forces at play in the arena are by no means limited to TLOs, for the major
political players are by their nature intensely local. But the constitution-making
world is one in which all these actors compete, with some gaining advantage and
others losing out.
Yet at the same time, we do see an increasingly dense network of specialists
emerging in the field. These actors seek to create a kind of epistemic field, and to
provide order to the messy world of constitution-making. We might thus say
without exaggeration that constitution-making is a field in which order is emerging.
But there are also, by nature of the policy problem being confronted, elements of
disorder at play. Constitution-making exercises regularly fail; there is no guarantee
of success, and there is no agreed upon set of norms, discrete from other TLOs that
one could identify as being exclusive to constitution-making. We hope that trying
to use the TLO framework to understand constitution-making has also illuminated
aspects of the very concept of the TLO itself.

164.
For example, Transnational Legal Orders for human trafficking or human rights
accountability are identified in the Halliday and Shaffer book. See also Paulette Lloyd and Beth A.
Simmons, Framing for a New Transnational Legal Order: The Case of Human Trafficking, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 2, at 400; Leigh A. Payne, The Justice Paradox? Transnational Legal Orders and
Accountability for Past Human Rights Violations, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 2, at 439.

